Glossary
Address poisoning is a scam where a fraudster sends zero-value transfers from an address that mimics one in your transaction history. The lookalike lands in your copy-paste list, and one hurried send later, your funds are on the scammer's ledger entry instead.
Address poisoning is a scam that attacks the copy-paste habit. A fraudster sends you a zero-value transfer from an address engineered to look like one you have sent to before - the first and last characters match, the middle is different. The fake transfer lands in your wallet's transaction history, so the lookalike address now sits beside the real one wherever your history is displayed.
The theft happens later, not on receipt. Next time you send funds, you scan your history for the address, copy the lookalike, and send real money to the scammer. Nothing on the chain warns you - the transfer is valid, the address exists, and the funds are gone on arrival. The defence is procedural: check more than the first and last characters, or use a saved address book. The wallet address entry covers the address format this scam exploits.
The attack starts with your transaction history, which is public. Anyone who knows your address can see every address you have sent to, and a fraudster picks one you are likely to send to again - an exchange deposit address, a payee, your own wallet. They generate a vanity address matching the target's first and last several characters, which costs compute time and nothing else.
The poisoned transfer arrives: zero value, from the lookalike, entirely valid on chain. Wallets display it in your history next to the genuine article. The scammer's cost is a transaction fee; the entire bet is that a future you will scan the history, pattern-match the familiar ends, and copy the wrong one. A hurried send at a bad hour is the target demographic.
The defence inverts the habit. Copy addresses from a saved address book rather than from history, or verify more of the string than the ends - several characters from the middle defeat the vanity generation at reasonable cost. QR codes from trusted sources defeat it entirely, and a small test transaction before a large send catches the wrong address at the cheap stage. The transaction signing entry covers the related habit of reading what you are actually approving.
Address poisoning matters because it attacks the most natural gesture in crypto - scanning your own history for an address you have used before. Australian buyers moving funds between exchanges and self-custody wallets do exactly this constantly, and the scam converts that convenience into a one-way transfer.
A colleague named Brent (yes, that Brent) copied a lookalike from his history while sending a five-figure withdrawal, matched the first and last characters, and confirmed. The funds landed on the scammer's address with no recourse - the transfer was valid, the address was real, and the chain does not refund pattern-matching errors. The phishing entry covers the wider scam family.
The highest-leverage habits are to save addresses in your wallet's address book, check the middle of the string before large sends, and send a small test transaction first. The test costs a couple of dollars in fees; the alternative costs the entire withdrawal, and no exchange refunds it. The transaction-id entry is how any transfer that goes missing gets documented, though not reversed.
Your exchange deposit address starts bc1q and ends 4x9f. The scammer generates a matching pair of bookends with a different middle and sends you a zero-value transfer from it. Your history now shows two addresses with identical ends, and a hurried copy-paste picks the fake. Checking four characters from the middle of the string defeats the entire trick in two seconds. The middle of a bech32 address is where the randomness lives, which is why the ends alone are never enough.
Before sending $20,000 of bitcoin, you send $50 as a test from your wallet to the saved address book entry. The $50 lands where it should, the main transfer follows the same saved entry, and the lookalike in the history is never touched. The test costs a couple of dollars in fees and removes the whole class of error. A test send from the address book confirms the entry before the main transfer depends on it.
A transfer to the wrong address is valid by every rule the network enforces: correct signature, real address, confirmed block. There is no reversal mechanism and no support desk with admin rights over the ledger. The scammer's only exposure is cashing out, which is why prevention is the entire defence. The chain's record is readable via the TXID on any explorer, but there is no reversal form to file and no support desk with undo rights.
Mistake: Copying an address from your transaction history.
Why it bites you: History is where the lookalike lives, and the first and last characters match by design. Use the saved address book instead, which the scam cannot poison with a lookalike.
Mistake: Verifying only the first and last characters of an address.
Why it bites you: The vanity generation exists to match exactly those characters. Check several characters from the middle, where forgery gets computationally expensive.
Mistake: Sending a large amount without a test transaction.
Why it bites you: The test send costs a fee; the wrong address costs the lot. Brent's five-figure withdrawal had no test transaction and no recourse afterwards.
Mistake: Assuming zero-value transfers are harmless clutter.
Why it bites you: They are bait, and the trap springs on your next send. Ignore them entirely, and never interact with unsolicited transfers of any size.
I spent a morning generating vanity addresses myself so you do not have to, and the compute cost of matching four characters at each end was trivial - which is exactly the scammer's business case. Matching the middle is where the cost curves up, which is why my rule is to read the middle before anything over a few hundred dollars.
The part that annoys me is that the defence is a habit, not a product. Address book, test transaction, done. Brent pattern-matched his way to a five-figure loss with a clear conscience, because every character he checked was correct. The two characters you do not check are the scam's entire profit margin.
It does not steal on receipt - it plants a lookalike address in your transaction history with a zero-value transfer. The theft happens when you later copy that address instead of the real one.
Check several characters from the middle of the string, not just the first and last, or use your wallet's saved address book. A small test transaction before a large send catches any error cheaply.
The zero-value transfer is valid and permanent, like any on-chain transaction. There is no reversal mechanism, and the theft only becomes visible when your real funds arrive at the scammer's address.
Anyone who knows your address can send transfers to it, including zero-value bait. Ignore unsolicited transfers entirely - interacting with them is what the next stage of the scam expects.
They show the full address on their screen for verification, which defeats the copy-paste shortcut. The habit of reading the device's display before confirming is the protection - the hardware alone is not.
Disclaimer: This information is general in nature and does not constitute financial or legal advice. Always consult a qualified professional for your specific situation.

Financial Chaos Analyst
Ivy Sinclair-Wren is a Financial Chaos Analyst covering crypto markets, investing behaviour, and the Australian habit of checking prices during family dinners. Based in Melbourne, she reviews AUD Crypto Tracker's coin guides for accuracy, ATO alignment, and ruthless utility — no hype, no predictions, just what the data says.