Glossary
A SIM swap attack is when a scammer transfers your phone number to their SIM card, intercepting your calls, texts, and SMS authentication codes. SMS 2FA protects nothing against it - the code arrives on the scammer's phone, not yours.
A SIM swap attack is a takeover of your phone number rather than your device. The scammer contacts your telco with personal details harvested from data breaches, poses as you - or bribes an insider - and ports your number to a SIM card they hold. From that moment, every call and every text to your number arrives on the scammer's phone. Your device shows 'no service' while the number lives somewhere else.
The target is every account secured by SMS. Password resets arrive by text, so the scammer resets your email first, then your exchange account, then anything the email unlocks. An account with SMS two-factor authentication is not protected by the second factor at all - the code is generated on the scammer's phone, and they type it in themselves. The SMS factor authenticates whoever holds the SIM, not whoever owns the number.
For Australian readers, the personal details that seed the attack circulate from local data breaches - the Optus and Medibank breaches of 2022 exposed millions of customers' names, dates of birth, and addresses. ACCC Scamwatch and the ACMA warn about the pattern, and telcos offer account PINs as a partial defence. The attack works because the details it needs are already public.
The attack runs in sequence. First, the scammer harvests your personal details from a data breach or a phishing message - name, date of birth, address, and often the last digits of an ID document. Second, they contact your telco, pose as you with those details, and request a port or a replacement SIM. A complicit or deceived staff member activates your number on their SIM, and your device drops to 'no service' within the hour.
Third, the takeover compounds. Password resets arrive by SMS, so the email is reset first - the email is the master key to everything else. Then the exchange account, the bank, and any account the email unlocks, each defended by an SMS code the scammer now receives. The sequence takes hours, not weeks, and it usually happens at a time chosen for maximum inconvenience - a Sunday afternoon, a public holiday, a time zone you are asleep in.
The defence stack is specific. Authenticator apps generate codes on your device and never touch the telco, so a ported number cannot intercept them. Telco account PINs add a second question the scammer must answer to port the number, and unique passwords across email and exchange stop one reset from unlocking both. The seed phrase is the final layer that never moves - it is written on paper, not held by a telco, and no port can extract it.
SMS two-factor authentication is the default on Australian exchanges, and a SIM swap is the mechanism that makes it worthless. The two-factor authentication entry already recommends authenticator apps over SMS; the sim-swap attack is the reason the recommendation matters. ACCC Scamwatch logs hundreds of millions of dollars lost to investment scams each year, and the personal details that seed interception attacks circulate from local breaches.
A colleague named Brent (yes, that Brent) had SMS 2FA on everything because 'it's what the bank uses'. His number was ported on a Sunday afternoon while he watched a football match, and by Monday evening his email and exchange account were drained - the codes arrived exactly where the scammer wanted them, and he never saw one. The telco reversed nothing. The exchange could not verify him, because the person they had been verifying was the scammer.
The highest-leverage thing most Australians can do is move every account off SMS two-factor authentication to an authenticator app today - the swap takes minutes per account and closes the entire attack. Set a telco account PIN, use unique passwords, and read the phishing entry for the messages that harvest the details this attack runs on.
Your phone drops to 'no service' on a Sunday afternoon - your number has been ported to a scammer's SIM. Within the hour, password reset texts for your email arrive on their phone, and the email is reset. By Monday, the exchange account behind it is reset too, each step defended by an SMS code the scammer receives. The 30 minutes of silence was the only warning, and it looked like a coverage issue.
Two accounts hold the same $8,000 AUD of crypto. One is secured by SMS two-factor authentication; the scammer's port intercepts its codes and drains it. The other is secured by an authenticator app - the codes are generated on the owner's device and never touch the telco, so the port intercepts nothing. The ported number was identical in both attacks. The second factor is the only difference, and one of them moves with the number.
A scammer with a ported number resets an exchange account and finds the coins already withdrawn to self-custody. The seed phrase controlling that wallet is a paper copy in a drawer - no telco holds it, no SMS can reset it, and no password reset extracts it. The attack ran perfectly against everything the telco touched and failed against the one layer that does not move.
Mistake: Using SMS two-factor authentication on email and exchange.
Why it bites you: A ported number intercepts every SMS code, so the second factor authenticates the scammer. The email is the master key - once it falls, everything behind it falls within hours.
Mistake: Ignoring sudden loss of mobile service.
Why it bites you: Thirty minutes of 'no service' is the attack's only warning, and it looks like a coverage issue. Brent watched a football match through his, and by Monday the accounts were gone.
Mistake: Reusing one password across email and exchange.
Why it bites you: A password reset on the reused credential unlocks both accounts in sequence. Unique passwords stop one breach from being the whole breach.
Mistake: Assuming the telco will spot the fake port.
Why it bites you: Telcos process thousands of ports daily, and a scammer with breached personal details passes the standard checks. Account PINs help; the assumption that someone else is checking is the vulnerability.
I spent an evening moving my own accounts off SMS two-factor authentication so you do not have to - twelve accounts, forty minutes. The honest summary is that I had been securing a house with a lock the postman could collect. Every code my bank, my exchange, and my email sent arrived on a SIM card that a stranger could own by lunchtime.
The useful version is mechanical: authenticator apps generate codes on the device, telco PINs add a question to the port, and unique passwords stop one reset from being the whole reset. I ran the attack sequence against my own setup before the swap, and the SMS version failed at every step the telco touched. A SIM swap is the most boring catastrophe in crypto - it happens while you watch sport, and the only defence is the forty minutes you have not spent yet.
A scammer transfers your phone number to their SIM card by deceiving your telco, so every call and text to your number - including SMS authentication codes - arrives on their phone. Your device shows 'no service' while your accounts are reset one by one.
Sudden loss of mobile service while others around you have coverage is the warning sign - your number has been activated elsewhere. Password reset notifications you did not request, arriving by email, are the next sign, and they mean the takeover is already compounding.
Move every account off SMS two-factor authentication to an authenticator app, set a port-out or account PIN with your telco, and use unique passwords across email and exchange. The personal details scammers use circulate from local data breaches, so assume yours are already public.
It is better than no second factor and worthless against a SIM swap, because the code arrives on whichever phone holds the SIM. Australian exchanges and the ACMA both recommend authenticator apps, which generate codes on your device and never touch the telco.
They reset your email first by SMS, then the exchange, bank, and social accounts behind it, each defended by a code they now receive. The sequence takes hours, is timed for when you are asleep or distracted, and ends with the accounts drained before you have service back.
Disclaimer: This information is general in nature and does not constitute financial or legal advice. Always consult a qualified professional for your specific situation.

Financial Chaos Analyst
Ivy Sinclair-Wren is a Financial Chaos Analyst covering crypto markets, investing behaviour, and the Australian habit of checking prices during family dinners. Based in Melbourne, she reviews AUD Crypto Tracker's coin guides for accuracy, ATO alignment, and ruthless utility — no hype, no predictions, just what the data says.